Threat Research Blog

Molerats, Here for Spring!

Between 29 April and 27 May, FireEye Labs identified several new Molerats attacks targeting at least one major U.S. financial institution and multiple, European government organizations.

When we last published details relevant to Molerats activity in August of 2013, we covered a large campaign of Poison Ivy (PIVY) attacks directed against several targets in the Middle East and the United States. We felt it was significant to highlight the previous PIVY campaigns to:

  1. Demonstrate that any large-scale, targeted attacks utilizing this off-the-shelf Remote Access Tool (RAT) shouldn’t be automatically linked to Chinese threat actors.
  2. Share several documented tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and indicators of compromise (IOC) for identifying Molerats activity.

However, this was just one unique facet to a much broader series of related attacks dating back to as early as October 2011 and are still ongoing. Previous research has linked these campaigns to Molerats, but with so much public attention focused on APT threat actors based in China, it’s easy to lose track of targeted attacks carried out by other threat actor groups based elsewhere. For example, we recently published the "Operation Saffron Rose" whitepaper, detailing a rapidly evolving Iranian-based threat actor group known as the “Ajax Security Team."

New Attacks, Same Old Tactics

With the reuse of command and control (CnC) infrastructure and a similar set of TTPs, molerats1Molerats activity has been tracked and expanded to a growing target list, which includes:

  • Palestinian and Israeli surveillance targets
  • Government departments in Israel, Turkey, Slovenia, Macedonia, New Zealand, Latvia, the U.S., and the UK
  • The Office of the Quartet Representative
  • The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
  • A major U.S. financial institution
  • Multiple European government organizations

Previous Molerats campaigns have used several garden-variety, freely available backdoors such as CyberGate and Bifrost, but, most recently, we have observed them making use of the PIVY and Xtreme RATs. Previous campaigns made use of at least one of three observed forged Microsoft certificates, allowing security researchers to accurately tie together separate attacks even if the attacks used different backdoors. There also appears to be a habitual use of lures or decoy documents – in either English or Arabic-language – with content focusing on active conflicts in the Middle East. The lures come packaged  with malicious files that drop the Molerats’ flavor of the week, which happen to all be Xtreme RAT binaries in these most recent campaigns.

Groundhog Day

On 27 May we observed at least one victim downloading a malicious .ZIP file as the result of clicking on a shortened Google URL – http://goo[.]gl[/]AMD3yX – likely contained inside of a targeted spearphishing email. However, we were unable to confirm for this particular victim:


1) “حصري بالصور لحظة الإعتداء على المشير عبد الفتاح السيسي.scr” 
(MD5: a6a839438d35f503dfebc6c5eec4330e)

  • Malicious download URL was sent to a well-known European government organization.
  • The shortened URL breaks out to “http://lovegame[.]us/ Photos[.]zip,” which was clicked/downloaded by the victim.
  • The extracted binary, “حصري بالصور لحظة الإعتداء على المشير عبد الفتاح السيسي.scr,” opens up a decoy Word document and installs/executes the Xtreme RAT binary into a temp directory, “Documents and Settings\admin\Local Settings\Temp\Chrome.exe.”
  • The decoy document, “rotab.doc,” contains three images (a political cartoon and two edited photos), all negatively depicting former military chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
  • Xtreme RAT binary dropped: “Chrome.exe” (MD5: a90225a88ee974453b93ee7f0d93b104), which is unsigned.
  • As of 29 May, the URL has been clicked 225 times by a variety of platforms and browser types, so the campaign was likely not limited to just one victim.
  • Two of the download referrers are webmail providers (” and “”) further indicating the malicious URL was likely disseminated via spearphishing emails.

On 29 April we observed two unique malicious attachments being sent to two different victims via spearphishing emails:

2) 8ca915ab1d69a7007237eb83ae37eae5moleratssss

  • Malicious file sent to both the financial institution and Ministry of Foreign Affairs targets.
  • Drops an Arabic language decoy document titled “Sisi.doc”, which appears to contain several copy/pasted excerpts of (now retired) Egyptian Major General Hossam Sweilem, discussing military strategy and the Muslim Brotherhood.
  • The title of the document appears to have several Chinese characters, yet the entire body of the document is written in Arabic. As noted in our August 2013 blog post, this could possibly be a poor attempt to frame China-based threat actors for these attacks.
  • Xtreme RAT binary dropped: “sky.exe” (MD5: 2d843b8452b5e48acbbe869e51337993), which is unsigned.


3) “Too soon to embrace Sisi _ Egypt is an unpredictable place.scr" (MD5: 7f9c06cd950239841378f74bbacbef60)

  • Malicious file only sent to a European government organization.
  • Drops an English language decoy document also titled “Sisi.doc”, however this one appears to be an exact copy of a 23 April Financial Times’ news article about the uncertainties surrounding former military chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi running for president in the upcoming Egyptian elections.
  • Drops the same Xtreme RAT binary: “sky.exe” (MD5: 2d843b8452b5e48acbbe869e51337993), which is unsigned.

Another attribute regularly exhibited by Molerats malware samples are that they are often archived inside of self-extracting RAR files and encoded with EXECryptor V2.2, along with several other legitimate looking archived files.

Related Samples

Both of the malicious files above have a compile date/time of 2014-04-17 09:43:29-0000, and, based on this information, we were able to identify five additional samples (one sample only contained a lure but no malicious binary), related to the 29 April attacks. These samples were a little more interesting, because they contained an array of either attempted forged or self-signed Authenticode certificates.

All of the additionally identified samples were sent to one of the same European government organizations mentioned previously.

4) 2b0f8a8d8249402be0d83aedd9073662molerats5

  • Drops an Arabic language Word Document titled “list.doc”.
  • The title of the document appears to have several Chinese characters, yet the entire body of the document is written in Arabic.
  • Xtreme RAT binary dropped: “Download.exe” (MD5: cff48ff88c81795ee8cebdc3306605d0). This malware is signed with a self-signed certificate issued by “FireZilla” (see below).Certificate serial number: {75 dd 9b 14 c6 6e 20 0b 2e 22 95 3a 62 7b 39 19}.


Forged FireZilla certificate

5) 4f170683ae19b5eabcc54a578f2b530bmolerats8

  • Drops an Arabic language Word Document titled “points.doc,” which appears to be an online clipping from a news article about ongoing Palestinian reconciliation meetings between Fatah and Hamas in the Gaza strip.
  • The title of the document appears to have several Chinese characters, yet the entire body of the document is written in Arabic.
  • Xtreme RAT binary dropped: “VBB.exe” (MD5: 6f9585c8748cd0e7103eab4eda233666). Though the malware appeared to be signed with a certificate named “Kaspersky Lab”, the real hash did not match the signed hash (see below).Certificate serial number: {a7 ed a5 a2 15 c0 d1 91 32 9a 1c a4 b0 53 eb 18}.


(Forged Kaspersky Lab certificate)

6) 793b7340b7c713e79518776f5710e9dd & a75281ee9c7c365a776ce8d2b11d28daredtext

  • Both drop an Arabic language Word Document titled “qatar.doc,” which appears to be an online clipping for a new article concerning members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the ongoing conflicts between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain – all against Qatar because of the country’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood.
  • The title of the document appears to have several Chinese characters, yet the entire body of the document is written in Arabic.
  • Xtreme RAT binary dropped by the first sample: “AVG.exe” (MD5: a51da465920589253bf32c6115072909), which is unsigned.

7) Pivoting off one of the fake Authenticode certificates we were able to identify at least one additional related binary, “vmware.exe” (MD5: 6be46a719b962792fd8f453914a87d3e), also Xtreme RAT, but doesn’t appear to have been sent to any of our customers. The malicious binary is also encoded with EXECryptor V2.2–similar to the samples above–and the CnC domain has resolved to IPs that overlap with previously identified Molerats malware.

Indicators of Compromise


Although the samples above are all Xtreme RAT, all but two samples communicate over different TCP ports. The port 443 callback listed in the last sample is also not using actual SSL, but instead, the sample transmits communications in clear-text – a common tactic employed by adversaries to try and bypass firewall/proxy rules applying to communications over traditional web ports. These tactics, among several others mentioned previously, seem to indicate that Molerats are not only aware of security researchers’ efforts in trying to track them but are also attempting to avoid using any obvious, repeating patterns that could be used to more easily track endpoints infected with their malware.


Although a large number of attacks against our customers appear to originate from China, we are tracking lesser-known actors also targeting the same firms. Molerats campaigns seem to be limited to only using freely available malware; however, their growing list of targets and increasingly evolving techniques in subsequent campaigns are certainly noteworthy.

MD5 Samples 

  • a6a839438d35f503dfebc6c5eec4330e
  • 7f9c06cd950239841378f74bbacbef60
  • 8ca915ab1d69a7007237eb83ae37eae5
  • 2b0f8a8d8249402be0d83aedd9073662
  • 4f170683ae19b5eabcc54a578f2b530b
  • 793b7340b7c713e79518776f5710e9dd
  • a75281ee9c7c365a776ce8d2b11d28da
  • 6be46a719b962792fd8f453914a87d3e

Older Molerats samples from Dec 2013 (not listed above)

  • 34c5e6b2a988076035e47d1f74319e86
  • 13e351c327579fee7c2b975b17ef377c
  • c0488b48d6aabe828a76ae427bd36cf1
  • 14d83f01ecf644dc29302b95542c9d35

 References & Credits

A special thanks to Ned Moran and Matt Briggs of FireEye Labs for supporting this research.