Threat Research

CARBANAK Week Part Two: Continuing the CARBANAK Source Code Analysis

Update (April 30): Following the release of our four-part CARBANAK Week blog series, many readers have found places to make the data shared in these posts actionable. We have updated this post to include some of this information.

In the previous installment, we wrote about how string hashing was used in CARBANAK to manage Windows API resolution throughout the entire codebase. But the authors used this same string hashing algorithm for another task as well. In this installment, we’ll pick up where we left off and write about CARBANAK’s antivirus (AV) detection, AV evasion, authorship artifacts, exploits, secrets, and network-based indicators.

Antivirus Evasions

Source code unquestionably accelerates analysis of string hashes. For example, the function AVDetect in AV.cpp iterates processes to detect AV by process name hash as shown in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Antivirus detection by process name hash

What does CARBANAK do with this information? It evades AV according to what is installed. Figure 2 shows the code for an AVG evasion that the authors disabled by commenting it out. Based on this, it appears as if the AVG evasion was retired, but FLARE team member Ryan Warns confirmed in November 2017 that it still worked with one minor tweak. FLARE disclosed this to AVG immediately upon confirming it. Avast indicates that after our disclosure, they updated the affected DLL to ignore DLL_PROCESS_DETACH and leave its hooks in place.


Figure 2: Commented out source code to unload AVG user-space hooks

In November of 2017, FLARE also disclosed an evasion for Trend Micro’s detection of process injection that remained active in the CARBANAK source code. The evasion mirrors a technique used in Carberp that replaces remote heap allocation and a call to CreateRemoteThread with memory mapping and queueing of an asynchronous procedure call via QueueUserAPC. Following our disclosure, Trend Micro indicated that they had updated their behavior monitoring rules and released OfficeScan XG SP1 in December 2017 with a new “Aggressive Event” detection feature that covers this behavior.

Author Characterization

Having source code could pose unique opportunities to learn about the individuals behind the keyboard. To that end, I searched for artifacts in the source code dump that might point to individuals. I found the most information in Visual Studio solution files. Most of these referenced drive O: as the source root, but I did find the following host paths:

  • C:\Users\hakurei reimu\AppData\Local\Temp
  • C:\Users\Igor\AppData\Local\Temp
  • E:\Projects\progs\Petrosjan\WndRec\...
  • E:\Projects\progs\sbu\WndRec\...

Unfortunately, these data points don’t yield many answers. If they are observed in later artifacts, connections might be inferred, but as of this writing, not much else is known about the authors.

Source Code Survey

The CARBANAK source code contained numerous exploits, previous C2 hosts, passwords, and key material. I decided to comprehensively search these out and determine if they led to any new conclusions or corroborated any previous observations.

Exploits

I wanted to know if the CARBANAK authors wielded any exploits that were not publicly disclosed. To the contrary, I found all the exploits to be well-documented. Table 1 breaks out the escalation code I reviewed from the CARBANAK source code dump.

Name

CVE

Notes

PathRec

2013-3660

Exploit proof of concept (poc) from May 2013

Sdrop

2013-3660

Exploit poc from June 2013

NDProxy

2013-5065

NDProxy.sys exploit originally authored by secniu

UACBypass

 

UAC bypass by DLL hijacking found in Carberp

COM

 

UAC bypass by disabling elevation prompts and dialogs via the IFileOperation COM interface

CVE-2014-4113

2014-4113

Win32k.sys exploit derived from code that can be found online

BlackEnergy2

 

AppCompat shim-based UAC bypass

EUDC

2010-4398

UAC bypass by EUDC exploitation

Table 1: Exploits for elevation found in CARBANAK source code

The CARBANAK source code also contains code copied wholesale from Mimikatz including the sekurlsa module for dumping passwords from lsass.exe and Terminal Services patching code to allow multiple remote desktop protocol connections.

Secrets

My analysis included an audit of passwords and key material found in the source code and accompanying binaries. Although many of these were used for debug versions, I curated them for reference in case a need might arise to guess future passwords based on passwords used in the source code. Table 2 shows recovered passwords used for RC2-encrypted communications and other purposes along with the corresponding name in the source code and their status as they were encountered (active in source code, commented out, or compiled into a binary).

Credential Identifier Per Source Code

Password

Status

ADMIN_PASSWORD

1He9Psa7LzB1wiRn

Active

ADMIN_PASSWORD

1234567812345678

Commented out

ADMIN_PASSWORD

cbvhX3tJ0k8HwnMy

Active

ADMIN_PASSWORD

1234567812345678

Commented out

N/A

1234567812345678

Compiled

Table 2: Passwords found in CARBANAK source code and binaries

I found an encrypted server certificate in a debug directory. This seemed like it could provide a new network-based indicator to definitively tie operations together or catch new activity. It was trivial to brute force this container by adapting a publicly available code sample of X509 handling in C# to cycle through passwords in a popular password list. The password was found in less than 1 second because it was the single-character password “1”. The certificate turns out to be for testing, hence the weak password. The certificate is shown in Figure 3, with details in Table 3.


Figure 3: Test Company certificate

Parameter

Value

Subject

CN=Test Company

Issuer

CN=Test Company

Serial Number

834C6C3985506D8740FB56D26E385E8A

Not Before

12/31/2004 5:00:00 PM

Not After

12/31/2017 5:00:00 PM

Thumbprint

0BCBD1C184809164A9E83F308AD6FF4DBAFDA22C

Signature Algorithm

sha1RSA(1.3.14.3.2.29)

Public Key

Algorithm: RSA

Length: 2048

Key Blob:

30 82 01 0a 02 82 01 01 00 e4 66 7f d2 e1 01 53

f9 6d 26 a6 62 45 8b a8 71 ea 81 9a e6 12 d4 1c

6f 78 67 6d 7e 95 bb 3a c5 c0 2c da ce 48 ca db

29 ab 10 c3 83 4e 51 01 76 29 56 53 65 32 64 f2

c7 84 96 0f b0 31 0b 09 a3 b9 12 63 09 be a8 4b

3b 21 f6 2e bf 0c c1 f3 e4 ed e2 19 6e ca 78 68

69 be 56 3c 1c 0e a7 78 c7 b8 34 75 29 a1 8d cc

5d e9 0d b3 95 39 02 13 8e 64 ed 2b 90 2c 3f d5

e3 e2 7e f2 d2 d1 96 15 6e c9 97 eb 97 b9 0e b3

be bc c3 1b 1e e1 0e 1c 35 73 f4 0f d9 c3 69 89

87 43 61 c9 9e 50 77 a2 83 e4 85 ce 5a d6 af 72

a9 7b 27 c5 f3 62 8d e7 79 92 c3 9b f7 96 ed 5c

37 48 0a 97 ee f7 76 69 a2 b9 25 38 06 25 7d 8a

e4 94 b2 bb 28 4a 4b 5d c5 32 0d be 8e 7c 51 82

a7 9e d9 2c 8e 6b d8 c7 19 4c 2e 93 8d 2d 50 b4

e0 a4 ed c1 65 a4 a1 ba bf c7 bf 2c ec 28 83 f4

86 f2 88 5c c4 24 8b ce 1d 02 03 01 00 01

Parameters: 05 00

Private Key

Key Store: User

Provider Name: Microsoft Strong Cryptographic Provider

Provider type: 1

Key Spec: Exchange

Key Container Name: c9d7c4a9-2745-4e7f-b816-8c20831d6dae

Unique Key Container Name: 5158a0636a32ccdadf155686da582ccc_2bb69b91-e898-4d33-bbcf-fbae2b6309f1

Hardware Device: False

Removable: False

Protected: False

Table 3: Test Company certificate details

Here is a pivot shared by @mrdavi51 demonstrating how this self-signed certificate is still hosted on several IPs.

FireEye has observed the certificate most recently being served on the following IPs (Table 4):

IP

Hostname

Last Seen

104.193.252.151:443

vds2.system-host[.]net

2019-04-26T14:49:12

185.180.196.35:443

customer.clientshostname[.]com

2019-04-24T07:44:30

213.227.155.8:443

 

2019-04-24T04:33:52

94.156.133.69:443

 

2018-11-15T10:27:07

185.174.172.241:443

vds9992.hyperhost[.]name

2019-04-27T13:24:36

109.230.199.227:443

 

2019-04-27T13:24:36

Table 4: Recent Test Company certificate use

While these IPs have not been observed in any CARBANAK activity, this may be an indication of a common developer or a shared toolkit used for testing various malware. Several of these IPs have been observed hosting Cobalt Strike BEACON payloads and METERPRETER listeners. Virtual Private Server (VPS) IPs may change hands frequently and additional malicious activity hosted on these IPs, even in close time proximity, may not be associated with the same users.

I also parsed an unprotected private key from the source code dump. Figure 4 and Table 5 show the private key parameters at a glance and in detail, respectively.


Figure 4: Parsed 512-bit private key

Field

Value

bType

7

bVersion

2

aiKeyAlg

0xA400 (CALG_RSA_KEYX) – RSA public key exchange algorithm

Magic

RSA2

Bitlen

512

PubExp

65537

Modulus

0B CA 8A 13 FD 91 E4 72 80 F9 5F EE 38 BC 2E ED

20 5D 54 03 02 AE D6 90 4B 6A 6F AE 7E 06 3E 8C

EA A8 15 46 9F 3E 14 20 86 43 6F 87 BF AE 47 C8

57 F5 1F D0 B7 27 42 0E D1 51 37 65 16 E4 93 CB

P

8B 01 8F 7D 1D A2 34 AE CA B6 22 EE 41 4A B9 2C

E0 05 FA D0 35 B2 BF 9C E6 7C 6E 65 AC AE 17 EA

Q

81 69 AB 3D D7 01 55 7A F8 EE 3C A2 78 A5 1E B1

9A 3B 83 EC 2F F1 F7 13 D8 1A B3 DE DF 24 A1 DE

Dp

B5 C7 AE 0F 46 E9 02 FB 4E A2 A5 36 7F 2E ED A4

9E 2B 0E 57 F3 DB 11 66 13 5E 01 94 13 34 10 CB

Dq

81 AC 0D 20 14 E9 5C BF 4B 08 54 D3 74 C4 57 EA

C3 9D 66 C9 2E 0A 19 EA C1 A3 78 30 44 52 B2 9F

Iq

C2 D2 55 32 5E 7D 66 4C 8B 7F 02 82 0B 35 45 18

24 76 09 2B 56 71 C6 63 C4 C5 87 AD ED 51 DA 2ª

D

01 6A F3 FA 6A F7 34 83 75 C6 94 EB 77 F1 C7 BB

7C 68 28 70 4D FB 6A 67 03 AE E2 D8 8B E9 E8 E0

2A 0F FB 39 13 BD 1B 46 6A D9 98 EA A6 3E 63 A8

2F A3 BD B3 E5 D6 85 98 4D 1C 06 2A AD 76 07 49

Table 5: Private key parameters

I found a value named PUBLIC_KEY defined in a configuration header, with comments indicating it was for debugging purposes. The parsed values are shown in Table 6.

Field

Value

bType

6

bVersion

2

aiKeyAlg

0xA400 (CALG_RSA_KEYX) – RSA public key exchange algorithm

Magic

RSA1

Bitlen

512

PubExp

65537

Modulus

0B CA 8A 13 FD 91 E4 72 80 F9 5F EE 38 BC 2E ED

20 5D 54 03 02 AE D6 90 4B 6A 6F AE 7E 06 3E 8C

EA A8 15 46 9F 3E 14 20 86 43 6F 87 BF AE 47 C8

57 F5 1F D0 B7 27 42 0E D1 51 37 65 16 E4 93 CB

Table 6: Key parameters for PUBLIC_KEY defined in configuration header

Network Based Indicators

The source code and binaries contained multiple Network-Based Indicators (NBIs) having significant overlap with CARBANAK backdoor activity and FIN7 operations previously observed and documented by FireEye. Table 7 shows these indicators along with the associated FireEye public documentation. This includes the status of each NBI as it was encountered (active in source code, commented out, or compiled into a binary). Domain names are de-fanged to prevent accidental resolution or interaction by browsers, chat clients, etc.

NBI

Status

Threat Group Association

comixed[.]org

Commented out

Earlier CARBANAK activity

194.146.180[.]40

Commented out

Earlier CARBANAK activity

aaaabbbbccccc[.]org

Active

 

stats10-google[.]com

Commented out

FIN7

192.168.0[.]100:700

Active

 

80.84.49[.]50:443

Commented out

 

52.11.125[.]44:443

Commented out

 

85.25.84[.]223

Commented out

 

qwqreererwere[.]com

Active

 

akamai-technologies[.]org

Commented out

Earlier CARBANAK activity

192.168.0[.]100:700

Active

 

37.1.212[.]100:700

Commented out

 

188.138.98[.]105:710

Commented out

Earlier CARBANAK activity

hhklhlkhkjhjkjk[.]org

Compiled

 

192.168.0[.]100:700

Compiled

 

aaa.stage.4463714.news.meteonovosti[.]info

Compiled

DNS infrastructure overlap with later FIN7 associated POWERSOURCE activity

193.203.48[.]23:800

Active

Earlier CARBANAK activity

Table 7: NBIs and prevously observed activity

Four of these TCP endpoints (80.84.49[.]50:443, 52.11.125[.]44:443, 85.25.84[.]223, and 37.1.212[.]100:700) were new to me, although some have been documented elsewhere.

Conclusion

Our analysis of this source code dump confirmed it was CARBANAK and turned up a few new and interesting data points. We were able to notify vendors about disclosures that specifically targeted their security suites. The previously documented NBIs, Windows API function resolution, backdoor command hash values, usage of Windows cabinet file APIs, and other artifacts associated with CARBANAK all match, and as they say, if the shoe fits, wear it. Interestingly though, the project itself isn’t called CARBANAK or even Anunak as the information security community has come to call it based on the string artifacts found within the malware. The authors mainly refer to the malware as “bot” in the Visual Studio project, filenames, source code comments, output binaries, user interfaces, and manuals.

The breadth and depth of this analysis was a departure from the usual requests we receive on the FLARE team. The journey included learning some Russian, searching through a hundred thousand of lines of code for new information, and analyzing a few dozen binaries. In the end, I’m thankful I had the opportunity to take this request.

In the next post, Tom Bennett takes the reins to provide a retrospective on his and Barry Vengerik’s previous analysis in light of the source code. Part Four of CARBANAK Week is available as well.