Flare-On 6: Challenge 2 – Overlong.exe

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The challenge ZIP package contains a single file, Overlong.exe. The first step is to perform basic analysis of the file. First, we note that Overlong.exe is a very small Win32 executable less than 4 kilobytes in size. Examining the portable executable headers reveals that only the function MessageBoxA is imported. Running the program inside a sandbox virtual machine displays the string "I never broke the encoding:" in a message box. This message string does not appear when running strings on the binary in ASCII or wide character mode. This indicates that obfuscated strings exist within the program.

The next step is to disassemble the file in IDA Pro or Ghidra and look for the string obfuscation. Fortunately, this small binary contains just three functions. The entry point function at 0x4011c0 decompiles to the following code in Ghidra (Figure 1):

```c
undefined4 entry(void)
{
    byte local_88 [128];
    uint local_8;

    local_8 = FUN_00401160(local_88, &DAT_00402008, 0x1c);
    local_88[local_8] = 0;
    MessageBoxA((HWND)0x0, (LPCSTR)local_88, s_Output_00403000, 0);
    return 0;
}
```

**Figure 1: Decompilation of the entry point function at 4011c0**

We see that the entry point calls a function, passing it the address of a local 128-byte buffer, the address of some constant data in the rdata section, and a small constant value. The local buffer is then passed to MessageBoxA after zeroing out a byte. This suggests that the constant data might be an obfuscated string and the function at 0x401160 be a deobfuscation routine.

From here, there are a few different ways to find the solution. One way to find the solution is to observe that the function called from the entry point has a commonly seen three-argument signature consisting of an output buffer, input buffer, and length field. For example, the strcpy and memcpy library functions use this signature. Furthermore, the third argument 0x1C is equal to the length of the string "I never broke the encoding:" with a trailing space included. The length of the constant data at 0x402008 (176 bytes, with no intervening cross-references) suggests that more obfuscated string bytes might be present after the displayed message. A hex editor or debugger can be used to modify the 0x1C constant to a larger value.
Doing so and then running the program to completion will reveal the flag in the message box, as shown in Figure 2.

![Message box output](image)

**Figure 2: Message box output after modifying the length argument.**

Another way to find the solution is to recognize the significance of the term “overlong”, which appears in the name of the binary and in the challenge description. Internet searches for “overlong string,” “overlong encoding,” and similar queries reveal that the UTF-8 encoding has a quirk called an “overlong form” in which a code point can be encoded using more bytes than necessary. With this knowledge, revisiting and examining the constant data at 0x402008 in the rdata section reveals that UTF-8 overlong forms are present. For example, the bytes 0xe0 0x81 0x89 at 0x402008 are a three-byte overlong form of the code point 0x49, the ASCII capital letter I. This can be seen by following the rules for UTF-8 decoding described on the UTF-8 Wikipedia page and elsewhere.

Once the encoding algorithm is known to be UTF-8 with overlong forms, the entire obfuscated string at 0x402008, including the flag, can be decoded by hand, by writing a decoder script such as the one in Figure 5, or by using an online UTF-8 decoding tool such as the one found at this website: [http://www.ltg.ed.ac.uk/~richard/utf-8.html](http://www.ltg.ed.ac.uk/~richard/utf-8.html).

Another way to find the solution is to reverse engineer the deobfuscation function directly to determine the decoding algorithm. The function at 0x401160 (called from the entry point) decompiles to the following code in Ghidra (Figure 3):
uint FUN_00401160(byte *param_1, byte *param_2, uint param_3)
{
    byte bVar1;
    int iVar2;
    uint local_8;

    local_8 = 0;
    while( true ) {
        if (param_3 <= local_8) {
            return local_8;
        }
        iVar2 = FUN_00401000(param_1, param_2);
        param_2 = param_2 + iVar2;
        bVar1 = *param_1;
        param_1 = param_1 + 1;
        if (bVar1 == 0) break;
        local_8 = local_8 + 1;
    }
    return local_8;
}

Figure 3: Decompilation of the deobfuscation function at 0x401160

We observe that this function is a basic decoding loop. Each loop iteration calls a helper function passing it the current position in the input buffer and output buffer. The output position is then incremented while the input position is increased by a variable amount given by the return value of the helper function. The loop exits when a NUL character is placed in the output buffer or after the number of iterations given by the third parameter.

The helper function at 0x401000 decompiles to the following code in Ghidra with some reformatting (Figure 4):
undefined4 FUN_00401000(byte *param_1, byte *param_2)
{
    undefined4 local_c;
    byte local_8;

    if ((uint)*param_2 >> 3 == 0x1e) {
        local_8 = (((uint)param_2[2] & 0x3f) << 6) | param_2[3] & 0x3f;
        local_c = 4;
    }
    else if ((uint)*param_2 >> 4 == 0xe) {
        local_8 = (((uint)param_2[1] & 0x3f) << 6) | param_2[2] & 0x3f;
        local_c = 3;
    }
    else if ((uint)*param_2 >> 5 == 6) {
        local_8 = (((uint)*param_2 & 0x1f) << 6) | param_2[1] & 0x3f;
        local_c = 2;
    }
    else {
        local_8 = *param_2;
        local_c = 1;
    }
    *param_1 = local_8;
    return local_c;
}

Figure 4: Decompilation of the helper function at 0x401000

The helper function branches based on the value of the first byte at the input position (second argument). There are four cases that respectively consume 1, 2, 3, or 4 bytes from the input data. Bitwise arithmetic is used to produce a single byte, which is written at the output position (first argument), and the number of bytes consumed is returned.

With the algorithm reverse engineered, a script can be written to operate on the obfuscated string. A sample Perl script to perform the deobfuscation is shown in Figure 5. The output of the script is shown in Figure 6.
#!/usr/bin/perl

# Read the obfuscated bytes from the executable
open(FH, '<:raw', 'Overlong.exe') or die "Overlong.exe: $!\n"
seek(FH, 0x808, 1);
sysread(FH, $buf, 0xb8);
close(FH);

# Unpack the bytes into an array of unsigned values
@bytes = unpack("C*", $buf);
$i = 0;
$c = 1;

# Loop over the array decoding UTF-8 encoded ASCII characters
while ($i < @bytes && $c != 0)
{
    if ($bytes[$i] >> 3 == 0x1e) {
        $c = ($bytes[$i + 2] & 0x3f) << 6 | $bytes[$i + 3] & 0x3f;
        $i += 4;
    }
    elsif ($bytes[$i] >> 4 == 0xe) {
        $c = ($bytes[$i + 1] & 0x3f) << 6 | $bytes[$i + 2] & 0x3f;
        $i += 3;
    }
    elsif ($bytes[$i] >> 5 == 6) {
        $c = ($bytes[$i] & 0x1f) << 6 | $bytes[$i + 1] & 0x3f;
        $i += 2;
    }
    else {
        $c = $bytes[$i];
        $i++;
    }
    print chr($c);
}
print "\n";

Figure 5: Perl script to decode obfuscated string
Figure 6: Output of decoder script showing message and flag string

```
$ perl decoder.pl
I never broke the encoding: I_a_M_t_h_e_e_n_C_o_D_i_n_g@flare-on.com
$ 
```