Challenge #4 is a 32-bit PE file. At first glance, and even after some deeper analysis, it appears to be some version of Windows’ Notepad application. IDA Pro can even properly apply Microsoft’s PDB for notepad.exe from Microsoft’s symbol server. However, looking at the code at the entry point quickly reveals that this binary has been modified. The presence of stack strings, calls to a function that locates loaded modules in the process via the process environment block (PEB), and import name hashes are good indicators that we are dealing with code foreign to notepad.exe. Another strong indicator of modification of the PE is that the entry point specified in its headers is pointing to somewhere in the .rsrc section! Normally, a PE’s entry point will point to somewhere within the .text section where the binary’s code is stored. At the end of the entry point’s function, we see a push/ret instruction sequence which is a technique used to change the thread’s instruction pointer to a new location. The ret instruction pops the address off of the top of the stack and jumps to it. The address pushed onto the stack is at offset 0x739D from the base address of notepad.exe. This address points to the start of a function that contains calls to initterm, getmainargs, and GetStartupInfo, indicating that it is likely the CRT initialization function that would have originally been called after the PE is loaded. Putting together what we know so far, running notepad.exe will likely execute some foreign payload and then execute the original Notepad application’s code. Running the executable confirms the theory.

Dealing with stack strings is annoying, and thankfully the latest version of FLOSS is able to locate and decode these for us in this challenge. This makes our analysis go much smoother. After dynamically loading its needed libraries and resolving its imports, the payload searches for 32-bit PE files in a directory named %USERPROFILE%\flareon2016challenge. It appends itself to each PE and modifies its headers, changing the last section’s size and permissions, the size of the image, the entry point, and the checksum of the PE as shown in Figure 1.
This confirms we are dealing with an appending virus, also known as a PE infector. Shortly before the
infection code at 0x101500B, it checks for the value 0x8675309 at offset 0x1C in the PE and does not infect it if found. When infecting, it adds this value to that offset of the PE. This is known as an “infection marker” so the virus does not attempt to infect the same PE twice.

So we know that this challenge is a virus, but where is the key? Before the infection check is performed, the function at 0x10146C0 is called for each PE that is found. This function first compares the compile timestamp value of the PE that is currently executing against a hard-coded value, then compares the compile timestamp value of the discovered PE against another hard-coded value. This comparison is repeated for several pairs of timestamp values until both are matched, or all pairs are tried. We can see from Figure 2 that the first timestamp value that is compared is identical to the second timestamp value that is compared in the previous pair.

![Figure 2: PE timestamp comparisons](image)

When a successful match is found the second timestamp value is converted to a string and printed in a message box, and the function at 0x10145B0 is called where eight bytes from offset 0x0C in the PE is appended to a file named key.bin. The final timestamp value comparison is only performed on the running executable. If it matches, 32 bytes are read from the key.bin file and are XORed against a 32
byte string of unprintable characters stored in a local variable. The resulting string is printed in a message box. This is likely our flag, but how do we get the correct contents into the key .bin file? Putting together what we know so far, it appears that a specific set of PE executables must be infected and executed in a specific order. This will put the proper contents into the key .bin file, which will then be decoded and printed on screen for us. Four binaries, eight bytes each, gives us a 32-byte key. The problem is: where are we going to find the files we need to infect? There is no directory named %USERPROFILE%\flareon2016challenge on any version of Windows by default. However, flareon2016challenge is a good hint for what we are looking for. If we translate the PE timestamps that are being compared against, most of them fall within the timeframe leading up to last year’s FLARE On challenge, further supporting the notion that we want to download the challenge binaries. Placing 2016’s FLARE On challenge binaries in the %USERPROFILE%\flareon2016challenge directory, and running our notepad.exe confirms our theory as we can see our first message box pop up (Figure 3)!

![Figure 3: Timestamp message box hint](image)

Now, it is just a matter of using our favorite PE file viewer to find the next executable we need to run. I used PEView because it translates our timestamps for us. Finally, the order of execution is challenge1.exe, DudeLocker.exe, khaki.exe, and unknown. Running the binaries in this order gives us our victory message box containing our key as shown in Figure 4!

![Figure 4: Final key message box](image)

The key is bl457_fr0m_th3_p457@flare-on.com.

PE infectors have been around for a very long time, although they are not as common as they used to be. They are the cause of many headaches for both their victims and the defenders who have to deal
with them. A major point of confusion for them from a defender’s perspective is the fact that a PE infector can infect other malware. Now you have malware samples that exhibit the behavior of two different malware families and communicate with multiple, unrelated Command and Control (C2) servers. This confuses C2 blacklist feeds, automated malware analysis systems, anti-malware products, and the defenders who use such services and products. Experiencing such confusion several times in my career was the inspiration for this challenge.