Flare-On 4: Challenge 6 Solution – payload.dll

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In this challenge, users were given a 64bit Windows DLL. The point of this challenge was to illustrate a trick which has been seen used in the wild, which I’m going call dynamic export table modification (DETM). This challenge is simple and attempts to focus only on the relevant code which implements DETM without having to deal with other anti-analysis and anti-debug related code.

Analysis

We can start this challenge by performing simple static analysis by running strings, we only get a small number of relevant unique strings as shown in Figure 1.

```
Error
Insert clever error message here!
Usage
rundll32 payload.dll, EntryPoint EntryPoint
payload.dll
EntryPoint
```

All the other strings found are compiler/ linker generated. The strings reveal a hint that the DLL should be executed using the rundll32 built-in windows executable. The command illustrates that you should use the export name EntryPoint and provide an argument string ‘EntryPoint’.

Before running, we can examine the exports from within IDA Pro. Figure 2 shows the exports table which agrees with our basic static analysis that the EntryPoint function exists.
Examining the EntryPoint export function as shown in Figure 3, reveals simple code to invoke the MessageBoxA function. The function is called with the usage message that we observed during our basic static analysis step. Weird!
At this point we have covered the basic static analysis step. Let’s try to follow the hint provided and run this sample dynamically. Running the sample with the provided hint reveals an error message that the entry point ‘EntryPoint’ is missing as shown in Figure 4. How is this possible? If this name exists within the sample’s export table, why do we get a Missing entry?
Figure 4 - Missing Entry Error

Some users at this point try to execute the exported function by ordinal number (Figure 5).

```
rundll32 payload.dll #1
```

Figure 5 - Running sample by ordinal

Trying this experiment reveals a different message as shown in Figure 6. This is a message box which contains a string which was found during our static analysis step. This means that the export ordinal #1 does exist, but the export name ‘EntryPoint’ does not.

Figure 6 - Clever error message

Before we look at the function that references the string ‘Insert clever error message here!’ in IDA Pro
lets first try to figure out why we cannot call the exported function ‘EntryPoint’.

Since we were given a hint that the payload should be loaded with rundll32, we can examine how rundll32 works. According to Microsoft\(^1\), rundll32 performs the following steps:

1. It parses the command line.
2. It loads the specified DLL via LoadLibrary().
3. It obtains the address of the <entrypoint> function via GetProcAddress().
4. It calls the <entrypoint> function, passing the command line tail which is the <optional arguments>.
5. When the <entrypoint> function returns, Rundll.exe unloads the DLL and exits.

Based on this information we can guess that step 3 is unable to obtain the address of the ‘EntryPoint’ function from payload.dll. The GetProcAddress function works by walking the export table of the target DLL to find the corresponding entry in its export table. Let’s perform this action manually using the debugger. While the MessageBox error message is still displayed showing the message “Missing Entry”, we can attach to the rundll32.exe process with WinDBG.

After we attach to process we can view the loaded modules using the ‘lm’ command as shown in Figure 7.

```
0:000> lm
  start         end                 module_name
  00007ff7`32d50000 00007ff7`32d67000  rundll32   (deferred)
  00007ff7`d2700000 00007ff7`d28aa000  uiautomationcore   (deferred)
  00007ff7`d28b0000 00007ff7`d2948000  tiptsf     (deferred)
  00007ff7`e1770000 00007ff7`e1a50000  iertutil   (deferred)
  00007ff7`e6970000 00007ff7`e69d5000  OLEACC     (deferred)
  00007ff7`f04a0000 00007ff7`f04bf000  payload  C (export symbols)
  00007ff7`f0550000 00007ff7`f0576000  dwmapi     (deferred)
...
```

*Figure 7 - Viewing loaded modules*

We can see that payload.dll is loaded at the base address 00007ff7`f04a0000. First, we find the address of the IMAGE_NT_HEADER structure by looking at the e_lfanew field of the IMAGE_DOS_HEADER as shown in Figure 8.

```
0:000> dt 00007ff7`f04a0000 nt\!_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER.e_lfanew
```

---

We can now view the export data directory by using the ‘dt’ command shown in Figure 9. This command uses the base address of payload.dll along with the e_lfanew field to calculate the correct location to the start of the IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.

```
0:000> dt 00007fff`f04a0000+0n272 nt!_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 -a16
OptionalHeader.DataDirectory.
ntdll!_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64
   +0x018 OptionalHeader
      +0x070 DataDirectory : [00]
         +0x000 VirtualAddress : 0x4000
         +0x004 Size : 0x200
```

The virtual address 0x4000 as displayed in Figure 9 is relative to the base address of payload.dll. This is the location in memory where the export directory exists. We can view this memory location using the ‘db’ command as shown in Figure 10.

Without fully parsing the data we can see some interesting strings, including a DLL name which was not visible during our basic static analysis phase.

```
db 00007fff`f04a0000+0x4000
00007ffe`f04a4000 00 00 00 00 18 33 22 11-00 00 00 00 32 40 00 00 ......3"......2@.. 
00007ffe`f04a4010 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00-00-01 00 00 00 28 40 00 00 ..........(@
00007ffe`f04a4020 2c 40 00 00 30 40 00 00-5a 00 00 3d 40 00 00 ,@..0@..PZ..=@.. 
00007ffe`f04a4030 00 00 68 65 72 65 73 79-2e 64 6c 6c 00 62 61 70 ..heresy.dll.bas 
00007ffe`f04a4040 6f 70 68 69 6c 65 73 6c-61 70 73 73 63 72 61 70 ophileslapsscrapp 
00007ffe`f04a4050 70 69 6e 67 00 00 00 00-00-00 00 00 00 00 00 ping.............
```

Since the export table does not match what is shown statically we can assume at this point the DETM has occurred. If we assume that the long string shown in the hex dump in Figure 10 is an exported function name, we can try to run rundll32 again with this potential export name as shown in Figure 11.

```
rundll32 payload.dll, basophileslapsscrapping
```

Figure 8 - Viewing e_lfanew field

Figure 9 - Viewing Export Data Directory

Figure 10 - Memory for export directory

Figure 11 - Running sample with new export name
We again receive the message “Insert clever error message here!”. This is the same message we received when attempting to use ordinal #1. This means the export name we provided does exist, and its code was properly executed, at least enough to give us a non-standard error message.

Going back to the export table which is located at RVA 0x4000 from Figure 10. We can use the IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY struct shown in Figure 12 as provided by Microsoft to interpret the data.

```c
typedef struct _IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY {
    DWORD Characteristics;
    DWORD TimeDateStamp;
    WORD MajorVersion;
    WORD MinorVersion;
    DWORD Name;
    DWORD Base;
    DWORD NumberOfFunctions;
    DWORD NumberOfNames;
    DWORD AddressOfFunctions;  // RVA from base of image
    DWORD AddressOfNames;      // RVA from base of image
    DWORD AddressOfNameOrdinals; // RVA from base of image
} IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY, *PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY;
```

Figure 12 - IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY Structure

By mapping the data to the struct, as shown in Figure 13, we get the following fields and values:

- Characteristics: 0x0
- TimeDateStamp: 0x11223318
- MajorVersion: 0x0
- MinorVersion: 0x0
- Name: 0x4032 (RVA) => "heresy.dll"
- Base: 0x1
- NumberOfFunctions: 0x1
- NumberOfNames: 0x1
- AddressOfFunctions: 0x4028 (RVA) => 0x5a50 (RVA)
- AddressOfNames: 0x402c (RVA) => 0x403d (RVA) => "basophileslapsscraping"
- AddressOfNameOrdinals: 0x4030 (RVA) => 0x0

Figure 13 - Parsed Export Directory

From reviewing this output we can see that the DLL name is “heresy.dll”, it includes one exported function with the name “basophileslapsscraping”, and the RVA of the exported function is 0x5a50. By
adding the image base address 0x180000000 with the RVA 0x5150 we end up with the address of the exported function as 0x180005a50. Quickly looking in IDA Pro we can also see that this export references the strings “Insert clever error message here!”. To determine why this message is presented we follow the logic of this function.

Knowing that the function “basophileslapsscraping” is the export name and using the hint that we should be executing this sample with rundll32. We again use Microsoft’s documentation to find the proper interface for exported functions as shown in Figure 14.

```c
void CALLBACK EntryPoint(HWND hwnd, HINSTANCE hinst, LPSTR lpszCmdLine, int nCmdShow);
```

*Figure 14 - Rundll32 Export Function Declaration*

With this function signature, we now know that the function 0x180005a50 has 4 arguments, so we can update the function in IDA with this information.

If we look at the ‘jnz’ instruction at address 0x180005B1F in IDA we can see that it is based on an inlined strcmp. The comparison is between the lpszCmdLine argument and a currently unknown local variable. The logic for the where the local variable came from is not immediately clear.

```asm
.text:0000000180005AF5 mov     rax, [rsp+188h+var_148]
.text:0000000180005AFA mov     rcx, [rsp+188h+lpszCmdLine]
```

*Figure 15 - Pointers for string comparison*

If we use a debugger we can quickly figure out what both var_148 and lpszCmdLine point to. While in a debugger, we can see that rax points to “basophileslapsscraping” (export name) and rcx points to an empty string. This is because we did not provide any arguments while running the rundll32 command. If we again remember the hint given, we should execute the rundll32 command using both an export name and the same export name as the argument as shown in Figure 16.

After running:

```bash
rundll32 payload.dll basophileslapsscrapping basophileslapsscrapping
```

*Figure 16 - Running sample with export name as an argument*

We get a new message shown in Figure 17 which is part of the key.
Now that we have a piece of the key we can re-visit the export function 0x180005a50 to understand how it works. The first thing it does is call the function 0x180004760. This function is responsible for returning a value stored at location 0x18001AB78 plus 0x88. The value at 0x18001AB78 is initially undefined. Its value is set in the function at address 0x1800046B0.

Looking at the function 0x1800046B0 in IDA we can see that it takes one argument, dereferences the value at offset 0x3c and checks for the magic value ‘PE’. If the magic value is found the value at the address is saved. We can rename the function 0x1800046B0 get_image_nt_header, and we can rename the address 0x18001AB78 to image_nt_header.

With this knowledge, we can now rename the function at address 0x0x180004760 to get_export_table_directory. This is because the export data directory is at offset 112 (0x88) from the beginning of the image_nt_header. The export function 0x180005a50 uses this export table directory and adds it to a value at address 0x18001AB70, which is initially undefined.

The function 0x180004670 is responsible for setting the value 0x18001AB70. This function takes one argument which is a pointer and dereferences the first word and compares the result to the magic value ‘MZ’. We can rename the function 0x180004670 to get_dos_header. Additionally, the address 0x18001AB70 can be renamed to dos_header.

The export function 0x180005a50 uses the export table directory and gets both the AddressOfNames and TimeDateStamp fields. The low byte of the TimeDateStamp is saved off in a local variable, and the name is compared with the argument as discussed above.

Assuming the export name and argument strings are equal, the function uses the VirtualProtect API to change the memory permissions on an area of memory. This area is defined from a table of functions
pointers where it is indexed based on the lower byte of the timestamp.

After the memory permissions have been changed, two functions are called which are responsible for decrypting one of functions. The decryption is performed in two steps and uses standard RC4. After the code is decrypted it invokes a function.

Now that we have a good idea of how the export function 0x180005a50 works, one path people may try is to change the index (low byte of TimeDateStamp) to decrypt an alternative key part function. This unfortunately does not work.

One thing that we noticed during our analysis of the exported function was the reference to both the saved image_nt_header and dos_header pointers. How were these values populated? There was no code within DLLMain which sets these values.

Looking at code which references both get_dos_header, and get_image_nt_header, we get the function 0x180005D30 which was called from 0x180004400. IDA has only one reference to this function which is a data reference as shown in Figure 18.

![Figure 18 - Data Reference](image)

It is not clear how it is possible for this function to be called. We can solve this mystery by again using a debugger. If we set a break point at the beginning of the function 0x180004400 and perform a backtrace using the ‘kv’ command as shown in Figure 19.

![Figure 19 - Backtrace](image)

We can see that the function was called from payload!EntryPoint+0x1d67. If we examine this location in IDA we can see that it is part of the _initerm function.

The _initerm function is responsible for initializing C++ objects and takes two pointers as arguments. The function continues through a list of function pointers from the first argument until it reaches the
second and executes all the pointers in between. If we mark both the start and end pointers we can see that the function of interest lies in-between.

```
.rdata:0000000180010250 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 START dq 0
; DATA XREF: dllmain_crt_process_attach(HINSTANCE__ * const,void * const)+AF↑o
.rdata:0000000180010258 00 44 00 80 01 00 00 00 dq
offset sub_180004400
.rdata:0000000180010260 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 END dq 0
; DATA XREF: dllmain_crt_process_attach(HINSTANCE__ * const,void * const)+A8↑o
```

The function 0x180005D30 performs the following tasks.

- First it finds the both the dos_header and image_nt_headers.
- Second, it changes the memory permission of the first page of memory of the image base address.
- Third, the function calls the get_export_data_directory function saves the value to a local variable.

The function then calls the function 0x180004710. This function gets the current system time, adds the year and month components together, and returns the results modulo 26. The function 0x180004710 can be renamed to get_date_mod_26.

Fourth, is a function call to 0x180005C40 which takes the date mod 26 as an argument. This code seeds a random generator using the date mod 26 argument. The function 0x180005C40 then uses the rand function to generate data to XOR against a buffer. The buffer is at address [0x180001000 + (0x200 * date)]. Meaning that the data is decrypts is dependent on the date which has been passed in.

We can re-name the function 0x180005C40 as decrypt_data_based_on_date.

Fifth, the function 0x180005D30 continues by using the value of [0x180001000 + (0x200 * date)] to overwrite the RVA field in the export data directory. Since this function is using mod 26, it means that there will be 26 possible export data directories. We have already encounter one based on today’s date.
Solution

We now know what we need to do to recover the key. The export tables are based on the date. We can keep incrementing the date month, recover the name of the exported function name, and then run rundll32 with the correct exported function name and argument. This can be a bit of a slow tedious process.

An easier solution would be to patch the binary and shown in Figure 20 and Figure 21 to bypass the requirement that the exported function name and rundll32 command line argument have to be the same equal.

\[
\textbf{.text:0000000180005B1F 0F 85 AC 00 00 00 jnz } \\
\textbf{ loc_180005BD1 }
\]

*Figure 20 - strcmp result before patch*

Becomes:

\[
\textbf{.text:0000000180005B1F 90 90 90 90 90 90}
\]

*Figure 21 - strcmp after patch*

With the patch in place we can now run the patched payload as shown in Figure 22:

\[
\text{rundll32 payload.dll, #1 "Hello World"}
\]

*Figure 22 - Running Patched payload.dll*

Running the patched payload results in a MessageBox giving us a key part. We can write a simple script to change the system date and invoke rundll32 in a loop 26 times. We can examine all of the MessageBox outputs shown in Figure 23 to recover the key.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{key[0]} &= 0x77; \\
\text{key[1]} &= 0x75; \\
\text{key[2]} &= 0x75; \\
\text{key[3]} &= 0x75; \\
\text{key[4]} &= 0x74; \\
\text{key[5]} &= 0x2d; \\
\text{key[6]} &= 0x65; \\
\text{key[7]} &= 0x78; \\
\text{key[8]} &= 0x70;
\end{align*}
\]
key[9] = 0x30;
key[10] = 0x72;
key[11] = 0x74;
key[12] = 0x73;
key[13] = 0x40;
key[14] = 0x66;
key[15] = 0x6c;
key[16] = 0x61;
key[17] = 0x72;
key[18] = 0x65;
key[19] = 0x2d;
key[20] = 0x6f;
key[21] = 0x6e;
key[22] = 0x2e;
key[23] = 0x63;
key[24] = 0x6f;
key[25] = 0x6d;

Key: wuuut-exp0rts@flare-on.com

Figure 23 - Key Parts and Key